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Abstract 
Parliamentary scrutiny reserves have become a popular parliamentary instrument for the scrutiny 
of EU documents over the last two decades. While the exact provisions for them vary between the 
member states and according to their parliaments’ overall scrutiny system, parliamentary reserves 
generally mean that government representatives do not, or cannot, officially agree to a proposal in 
the Council (or COREPER or the working groups) while the parliamentary scrutiny process is 
ongoing. Yet despite the proliferation of reserve provisions, we actually know very little about them. 
The paper will therefore provide an overview over the specific features of scrutiny reserves in 
different member states. In addition, it investigates whether scrutiny reserves actually are an 
effective instrument to safeguard parliamentary influence in EU affairs by looking at how they are 
being dealt with at different levels of the Council negotiations. 
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Introduction 
Parliamentary scrutiny reserves have become a popular parliamentary instrument for the scrutiny 
of EU documents over the last two decades. While the exact provisions for them vary between the 
member states and according to their parliaments’ overall scrutiny system, parliamentary reserves 
generally mean that government representatives do not, or cannot, officially agree to a proposal 
in the Council (or COREPER or the working groups) while the parliamentary scrutiny process is 
ongoing. In fact, the term ‘parliamentary’ or ‘scrutiny reserve’ refers to two different instruments, 
the domestic parliamentary provision designed to give parliament enough time to complete the 
scrutiny process and the instrument government representatives use in the European 
negotiations to indicate that they are not yet able to agree to a proposal. In the latter sense, 
reserves can be put down in the Council (COREPER or the working groups) by government 
representatives for other reasons as well, for example to indicate disagreement on general or more 
specific points (formal reserves) or because of translation issues (linguistic reserves). 
Although a number of parliaments have adopted procedures for a scrutiny reserve, and although 
they are frequently mentioned in the literature, we actually know very little about them. The aims 
of the paper are therefore fairly modest: The first aim is to provide an overview over the specific 
features of scrutiny reserves in different member states to understand the rationale behind their 
establishment and whether their proliferation can be seen as a sign for a greater harmonisation of 
scrutiny procedures among member states parliaments. The second aim of the contribution is to 
investigate whether these reserves actually are an effective instrument to safeguard parliamentary 
influence in EU affairs by looking at how they are being dealt with at different levels of the 
Council negotiations.  
The paper is based on a comparison between member states that have implemented specific 
scrutiny reserve systems, namely the UK, the Czech Republic, Malta, France, Germany, Italy and 
the Netherlands. In addition, parliaments with a mandating system usually have an inbuilt 
reserve system, as the government can only negotiate in the Council once it has received a 
parliamentary mandate. Regarding the empirical data, it draws on the secondary literature, 
official Council documents and expert interviews with members of the Permanent 
Representations as well as members of the Council General Secretariat.  
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On this basis the first section of the paper shows that the rationale for the establishment, the 
specific design and the use of parliamentary reserve provisions differs greatly between national 
parliaments. Parliamentary reserves thus provide a good illustration of the domestic differences of 
national parliaments’ adaptation to the EU beyond formal similarities. At the same time, our 
investigation shows parliamentary reserves have a very weak impact on the Council negotiations 
regardless of the specific institutional design. As the second part demonstrates, where the 
rationale for the introduction was to increase parliamentary influence on the government’s EU 
negotiations, parliamentary reserves remain a rather ineffective instrument. However, at the same 
time parliamentary reserves can help to develop informal cooperation between parliament and 
government, both at the political and administrative level. 
1. Scrutiny reserve systems within the Member States 
As mentioned in the introduction, explicit scrutiny reserves have been introduced in a number of 
other member states. Starting with the UK, where the parliamentary scrutiny reserve is a – if not 
the - key element of the scrutiny procedure, the following will give an overview over different 
domestic provisions regarding parliamentary reserves and analyse the rationale behind their 
establishment. The first part will outline these provisions in member states that have established 
explicit scrutiny systems, examining differences between member states and the extent to which 
the original UK reserve mechanism has served as a blueprint for institutional development. The 
second part will turn to the so-called mandating systems that have something of an inbuilt 
parliamentary reserve. 
1.1 Learning from the UK? Domestic Provisions on the Scrutiny 
Reserve 
The United Kingdom: the cornerstone of parliamentary scrutiny  
The scrutiny reserve of the House of Commons (and the House of Lords) is not the oldest (see 
below), but certainly the most famous of the parliamentary reserve provisions. Originally based 
on the voluntary commitment of successive governments from 1974 on
1
, the reserve was first 
formalised by a Resolution of the House on 30 October 1980 and is currently based on Resolution 
of 17 November 1998. It constrains government representatives from agreeing to legislative 
proposals, which the European Scrutiny Committee has not cleared or which are awaiting 
consideration by the House, usually though a debate in a European Committee or – more rarely - 
on the Floor of the House. Importantly, the reserve is automatic, i.e. parliament does not have to 
                                                          
1 House of Commons Debate of 02 May 1974, vol 872 cc523-525; Debate of 11 June 1974, vol 874 cc1425-1552. 
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select the documents it wants to put under the reserve. Rather, the reserve applies to all European 
legislative proposals until parliament has officially cleared them. 
The reserve system is a result of the debate over the consequences of EU membership on the 
principle of parliamentary sovereignty and can be seen as compensation for the constraints on the 
latter by EU integration.
2
 The main aim of the reserve is to impose ‘a general discipline on 
Ministers and Departments to provide [Explanatory Memorandums], to respond to the Scrutiny 
Committee’s requests for information and to arrange debates in advance of consideration by the 
Council’.
3
 A Minister may override a reserve, i.e. agree to a proposal before it has been cleared by 
parliament for ‘special reasons’, provided that he or she explains those reasons to the Scrutiny 
Committee at the first opportunity after deciding to give agreement. In practice Ministers do so at 
least by sending a letter to the Chair of the related committee.  
The reserve can be regarded as the cornerstone of the scrutiny procedure and as a strong 
incentive for the government, both at the administrative and the ministerial level, to provide 
Parliament with full information on a legislative proposal. Theoretically, the right to authorise the 
Government to commit to a legislative proposal in the Council is an important parliamentary 
prerogative. Yet interviews and documents point to the fact that MPs first concern is scrutiny 
rather than influence. The scrutiny reserve is seen as a tool to secure time and information but 
not for pushing cabinet members to change their views. MPs have an important tool in their 
hands, but they do not use it to become a policy player. Detailed information of the negotiation 
process rather allows MPs to alert government on potential problems in its negotiation position at 
an early stage. Interviews indicate that parliament plays this role especially on ‘horizontal issues’ 
affecting more than one EU policy.
4
 
And the procedure is indeed taken quite seriously both by the government and the parliament. 
For instance, a Cabinet Office guide on Parliamentary Scrutiny of EU Documents explains in 
much detail the government’s obligations and the limited circumstances under which a Minister 
may override the reserve.
5
 It also provides the EU Committees of both Houses with a bi-annual 
report on all breaches of the scrutiny reserve. Overrides of both House of Lords and House of 
Commons reserves still occur fairly frequently, on 281 (House of Lords) and 299 (House of 
                                                          
2 A. Cygan, EU affairs before the United Kingdom parliament: a case of scrutiny as substitute sovereignty? In O Tans et al. 
(eds.), National parliaments and European democracy: a bottom-up approach to European constitutionalism, Groningen: 
Europa Law Publishing, 2007: 75-96. On questions of parliamentary sovereignty related to the EU see T. Hartley, 
Constitutional problems of the European Union, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1999, pp. 123-183. 
3 House of Commons, The European Scrutiny System in the House of Commons - A short guide for Members of 
Parliament by the staff of the European Scrutiny Committee, April 2010, online at: 
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/european-scrutiny/ESC%20Guide%20 Revised%202010.pdf. 
4 Member of the Permanent Representation of the UK, interview A by phone on 17 February 2012. 
5 Cabinet Office, Parliamentary Scrutiny of European Union Documents - Guidance for Departments, 20 April 2009, online 
at: http://europeanmemorandum.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/files/parliamentary-scrutiny-departments.pdf 
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Commons) occasions between January 2006 and June 2011.
6
 However, the fact that the 
government is able to give precise numbers on the breaches by department tends to confirm that 
every breach is recorded and that the scrutiny system is taken seriously. In turn, the European 
Scrutiny Committee tends to investigate breaches of the scrutiny reserve very closely, even 
inviting Ministers to public sessions where they have to face the Committee’s questions on the 
reserve breach.
7
 As a Chairman of the European Scrutiny Committee of the Commons put it, ‘our 
job is to hunt them’.
8
 The Chairman of the European Union Committee of the House of Lords also 
regularly enquires about the number of breaches through formal parliamentary questions ‘to 
bring them to the wider notice of the House and the public’.
9
 Especially blatant instances of 
reserve overrides have even received broader media attention.
10
 Overall, the attitudes towards the 
scrutiny reserve mirror the role of individual reputation in political careers, the great proximity 
between parliament and cabinet members (who remain MPs) and the highly symbolic place of 
parliament within the British political culture. 
Czech Republic and Malta: the UK as the blueprint  
In the Czech Parliament, both Houses have the opportunity to place a legislative proposal under a 
scrutiny reserve. While the procedure in the Chamber of Deputies is, as mentioned, very similar 
to the one in the UK, with an automatic reserve placed on all documents under scrutiny and no 
time limit (§ 109b (3) Chamber Standing Rules), the rules for the Senate are more constraining. A 
reserve is placed on all documents under scrutiny (i.e. where parliament decides not simply to 
take note of it), but the decision to start the scrutiny process needs to be taken within 5 days of 
receipt of the document (§ 119d (1) Senate Standing Rules). In addition, the maximum period 
during which the government may not agree to a European legislative proposal has been set in 
accordance with the 8-week period stipulated in the Lisbon Treaty (§ 119d (2) Senate Standing 
Rules). In practice, however, the government seems willing to apply the time limit more 
generously: ‘given the fact that the proposal must pass through at least one Committee and 
through the plenum, this deadline is sometimes difficult to keep, the government accepts the 
decision being taken later. … According to the directive of government, the government applies 
                                                          
6 Lord Pearson of Rannoch in stenographic minutes, House of Lords, Wednesday 16 May 2012, column 402, online at: 
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201213/ldhansrd/text/120516-0001.htm#12051640000062. 
7 K. Auel and A. Benz, The Politics of Adaptation: The Europeanisation of National Parliamentary Systems, Journal of 
Legislative Studies 11 (3-4), 2005. 
8 Interview with ESC Chairman, cited from Auel and Benz, The Politics of Adaptation, op. cit. fn 7, p. 382.  
9 House of Lords European Union Committee, First Report, Report on 2010-12, p. 31, online at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201213/ldselect/ldeucom/13/13.pdf. 
10 For example, the override of a reserve on the EU draft council framework decision on the transfer of prisoners under 
Home Office Minister Joan Ryan in March 2007 was reported on both by the BBC and some newspapers. 
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the parliamentary scrutiny reserve if any of the chambers announces that it has yet to deal with 
the proposal in question’
11
.  
The Maltese parliament has also used the UK system as a blueprint for its own scrutiny reserve. 
The relevant Minister may not take a definite position on a document, which has been deposited 
in Parliament but has not yet been cleared from scrutiny by the relevant working group of the 
European and Foreign Affairs Committee. As the Committee points out in its 2007 annual report, 
the system ‘is similar to the Scrutiny Reserve Resolution applicable in the UK House of 
Commons’, and as in the UK the reserve is not legally binding and can be breached in special 
cases, but is aimed at ensuring ‘that Ministers exercise political discipline’.
12
  
France: a symbolic bone for Parliament? 
In France, the government’s commitment not to agree to a proposal in the Council until 
Parliament has completed its scrutiny was initially made in 1994
13
 by the centre-right Balladur 
government at a time where the parliamentary majority was sharply divided between Maastricht 
supporters and opponents. It was therefore a signal by pro-EU party leaders to sovereignist 
backbenchers that their concerns were taken into account. Since 1994, several directives 
(circulaires) issued by the Prime Minister have amended the initial provisions (the latest in 2010
14
) 
and have detailed the conditions under which the government has to put down a reserve, but 
without substantially changing the procedure. According to the current system of the reserve 
d’examen parlementaire, the government gives parliament four weeks to submit a draft 
resolution
15
 on a European document – a period that has been extended to eight weeks for 
legislative proposals that fall under the new early warning system on subsidiarity. If a draft 
resolution is submitted, the government will try to postpone the decision in the Council or, if this 
is not possible, place the French vote under a parliamentary reserve until the resolution is 
formally adopted.
16
  
                                                          
11 V. Knutelská, Working Practices Winning Out over Formal Rules: Parliamentary Scrutiny of EU Matters in the Czech 
Republic, Poland and Slovakia, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 12 (3), 2011, 320-339, p. 332. 
12 European and Foreign Affairs Committee, Annual Report 2007, p. 40, online at: 
http://www.parlament.mt/feacrelateddocuments?l=1. 
13 Premier Ministre, Circulaire du 19 juillet 1994 relative à la prise en compte de la position du Parlement français dans 
l'élaboration des actes communautaires, Journal Officiel n°167, 21 July 1994, page 10510. 
14 Premier Ministre, Circulaire du 21 juin 2010 relative à la participation du Parlement national au processus décisionnel 
européen, Journal Officiel n°0142, 22 June 2010, p. 11232. 
15 Draft resolutions have to be dealt with first by the Commission for European Affairs, then by the relevant permanent 
committee. Unless a final debate and vote on the draft resolution takes place in the plenary, the decision on the resolution 
by the permanent committee is considered final.  
16 In detail, the circulare stipulates the following: when the decision by the Council Presidency to put the legislative 
proposal on the agenda is made less than fourteen days before the Council meeting, the French Permanent Representation 
is asked to oppose this. If the Presidency drafts the agenda including the legislative proposal more than 2 weeks before the 
meeting, Member States are not allowed to oppose to the agenda. In this case, French representatives should nonetheless 
work towards a postponement of the decision or, if unsuccessful, must put a parliamentary reserve on their vote. Premier 
Ministre, Circulaire du 21 juin 2010, op. cit. fn 14. 
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Thus, rather than having a – theoretically - unlimited time for scrutiny as in the UK, Parliament is 
given a maximum period to complete the initial scrutiny of a proposal and to draft a resolution. 
After the elapse of this period, the reserve system simply ensures that parliament can complete 
the process of adopting (or rejecting) the final resolution. And even though the rules do not 
indicate a time limit for this second stage, the shared view is indeed that the whole scrutiny 
process should be completed within the eight (or four) week period. As the 2010 circulaire 
stipulates: ‘If a draft resolution has been introduced but not yet been adopted close to the end [of 
the eight week period], the government will inform Parliament about the schedule for adoption of 
the proposal’
17
, which implies that after the delay the European schedule takes precedence over 
the scrutiny rights of the Assemblée.  
In addition, the system is based on a directive (‘circulaire’) of the Prime minister, i.e. a simple self-
commitment of the government. Not only does it fail to create a similar sense of obligation both 
at the political and administrative level as in the UK, but Ministers and MPs are also not even 
really aware of it. It was only on one occasion, when the procedure was first established in 1994, 
that French MPs publicly refused to clear a document for a few days.
18
 Overall, French MPs have 
mainly focussed on their right to issue resolutions on an expanded range of EU documents, or on 
the competences and status of the EAC. In the end, both governmental and parliamentary civil 
servants see the reserve as a formal procedure. They check that a minimum period has been given 
to both houses and cooperate actively in order to clear the reserves so that French representatives 
are not hampered in their negotiations in Brussels. 
Germany: a tool for securing influence 
In Germany, the formal scrutiny reserve system was first implemented by an inter-institutional 
agreement between the Bundestag and the Government in 2006 and was then integrated into the 
‘Act on the Cooperation between the Federal Government and the German Bundestag in Matters 
of the European Union’ implemented in 2009 with the Lisbon Treaty.  
The provisions are twofold: On the one hand, the rules stipulate very broadly that the 
government shall give the Bundestag the opportunity to issue a resolution before participating in 
the decision-making process at the EU level and shall provide the Bundestag with a deadline until 
when parliamentary resolutions are appropriate given the EU negotiation schedule.
19
 However, 
                                                          
17 Premier Ministre, Circulaire du 21 juin 2010, op. cit. fn 14, translation by the authors. 
18 As a result, the Council adopted the related text a few days later than initially planned. See J.-D. Nuttens, Le Parlement 
français et l’Europe: l’article 88-4 de la Constitution, Paris, Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 2001, pp. 142-
144. 
19 ‘Vor ihrer Mitwirkung an Vorhaben gibt die Bundesregierung dem Bundestag Gelegenheit zur Stellungnahme. Hierzu 
teilt die Bundesregierung dem Bundestag mit, bis zu welchem Zeitpunkt eine Stellungnahme wegen der sich aus dem 
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while this implied scrutiny reserve applies to practically all decisions at the EU level (and is thus 
not limited to legislative proposals), it is rather restricted given that the scrutiny process has to fit 
the EU legislative schedule. So far, there is no rule obliging the government to delay a decision in 
the Council or to enter a parliamentary reserve if the scrutiny is not completed by the time the 
Council makes a formal decision.  
On the other hand, the rules also state that the Government has to base its negotiations on 
European legislative proposals on the Bundestag’s resolution. And if an important aspect or 
demand of a Bundestag resolution proves unachievable in the Council, the Government has to put 
down a parliamentary reserve in the Council and try to find an agreement with the Bundestag.
20
 
The purpose of the procedure is to give the Bundestag a chance to have a look at a negotiation 
situation where the government cannot (or does not want to) follow the resolution. In addition, it 
forces to government to explain itself to parliament before possibly ignoring their resolution. 
There is – again - no explicit rule on what happens if such an agreement cannot be found.  
The current system can be understood as a compromise between the Government that wanted to 
preserve its room of manoeuvre during EU bargains and some political actors (in particular the 
CSU and the Left List) that pushed for a mandating system during the last years. It is difficult, 
however, to assess how the reserve procedure works in practice. Anecdotal evidence does suggest 
that the government does not strictly adhere to its obligation of entering reserves in cases of 
conflict.
21
 In addition, internal (unpublished) monitoring reports from the Bundestag’s EU 
administrative unit PA 1 Europe have been cited as pointing out, inter alia, a lack of information 
on how the Bundestag resolutions were taken into account in the Council negotiations.
22
 Indeed, 
a member of the German Permanent Representation cannot remember such a reserve in the 
recent period in COREPER I.
23
 That members of the Bundestag take their right to scrutinise 
legislative proposals more seriously, at least when these proposals are of great importance, is 
demonstrated by the fact that the Green Party have filed action before the Constitutional Court 
on the grounds that the government failed to provide the Bundestag with timely information on 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Verfahrensablauf innerhalb der Europäischen Union ergebenden zeitlichen Vorgaben angemessen erscheint.’ § 9 (1) ‘Act 
on the Cooperation between the Federal Government and the German Bundestag in Matters of the European Union’. 
20 The right of the Government to decide against the opinion of the Bundestag where important foreign affairs or 
integration issues are concerned remains untouched. Thus, legally the resolutions of the Bundestag remain non-binding, 
and the parliamentary reserve put down by the government will only postpone the governmental decision in the Council 
to find an agreement with the Bundestag. 
21 For example, in March 2009 the Greens criticised that the government failed to enter a parliamentary reserve and to try 
to find an agreement with the Bundestag in the case of the negotiations on emission trading despite the fact that very 
specific parliamentary demand could not be achieved, see Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, Zwei Jahre Europa-Vereinbarung – 
Bundesregierung muss ihre Verpflichtungen unverzüglich vollständig erfüllen, Bundestagsdrucksache 16/12109, 4 March 
2009; The point is also made more broadly in: CDU/CSU, SPD und FDP, Vereinbarung über Zusammenarbeit in 
Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union ist einzigartig in Europa – Auslegungsfragen müssen geklärt, noch bestehende 
Defizite beseitigt werden, Bundestagsdrucksache 16/13169, 27 May 2009. 
22 For example, Bundestag Plenary Debate, 224. Session, 28 May 2009, online at: 
dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/16/16224.pdf.  
23 Member of the Permanent Representation of Germany, interview B by phone on 6 February 2012.  
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both the EMS and the ‘Euro Plus Pact’ (and thus, implicitly, with the opportunity to scrutinise 
these proposals) before the relevant meetings of the European Council. In its decision of 19 June 
2012
24
, the Court decided for the claimants, and while it did not specify the rules regarding the 
scrutiny reserve any further, it did reaffirm the Bundestag’s right to receive information in time to 
scrutinise EU issues fully and publicly before the government made any binding decision.  
Italy: A tool for the government? 
In Italy
25
, the scrutiny reserve system was first introduced in 2000. While Parliament demanded a 
procedure explicitly modelled on the UK system, the government only agreed to a watered down 
version (Art. 6 of Law 422/2000): The government was obliged to indicate explicitly the expected 
date of the adoption of a legislative proposal and unable to express the formal Italian position on 
the proposal before that date. This did not, however, prevent the government from committing 
itself in ‘preliminary agreements’. If Parliament had not indicated its opinion on the proposal 
before the relevant Council meeting, the government was free to vote on the proposal. No 
minimum time limit was agreed for parliamentary scrutiny (and thus there was no obligation 
from the government to enter a reserve at any time), but at least parliament was informed about 
the schedule at the EU level and able to organise the scrutiny process accordingly. In 2005, the 
process underwent a reform, mainly due to conflicts over the European Arrest Warrant.
26
 
According to Art. 4 of the Stucchi-Buttiglione Law (Law 11/2005), once parliament has started the 
scrutiny process of a legislative proposal, it can request that the government enter a 
parliamentary reserve in the Council. Interestingly, the Government also has the option to enter a 
reserve on its own initiative and inform Parliament about this action, thereby ‘implicitly inviting 
[Parliament] to offer its views on the subject matter’.
27
 In both cases, Parliament is given a period 
of 20 days to issue a resolution, a period that starts as soon as the government has informed 
Parliament that is has entered a scrutiny reserve on the document. According to Bindi, the new 
procedure can be seen as an illustration of the government’s changed attitude towards 
parliamentary scrutiny in EU affairs: ‘The parliament is no longer seen as an antagonist but as an 
ally, and its control is not an unwelcome interference but a tool to reinforce the quality and 
effectiveness of the Italian position within Council negotiations’.
28
 Still, so far the system does not 
seem very effective, especially as the responsible standing committees have found it difficult to 
adapt to the short period provided for the scrutiny process.  
                                                          
24 BVerfG, 2 BvE 4/11, 19.6.2012, online at: http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20120619 _2bve000411.html. 
25 On the following see F. M. Bindi, Italy and the European Union, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, 2011, pp. 99-
101; D. Girotto, Parliamentary Procedures in Italy concerning EU drafts and Community Law Implementation, UNIDEM 
Seminar "European Integration – Constitutional and Legal Reforms", Trieste, 10–13 September 2007. 
26 F. Impalà, The European Arrest Warrant in the Italian legal system Between mutual recognition and mutual fear within 
the European area of Freedom, Security and Justice 1 (2), 2005, 56-78. 
27 Bindi, Italy and the European Union, op. cit. fn 25, p. 100. 
28 Bindi, Italy and the European Union, op. cit. fn 25, p. 100. 
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The Netherlands: an early warning system 
Contrary to popular belief, it was not the UK parliament, but the Dutch Tweede Kamer that 
established the first scrutiny reserve in January 1967 in its first ever parliamentary resolution: The 
House, (...) judges that the Dutch Government shall not agree to definitive decisions in the 
Council on Community measures concerning the size and distribution of the tax burden unless it 
has previously consulted the Dutch Parliament.’
29
 However, the reserve system does not seem to 
have had much impact. Indeed, ‘important as this precedent may be for the history of European 
integration, it has largely been forgotten in the Netherlands itself’.
30
  
In 2009, the Dutch Parliament established the current scrutiny reserve system.
31
 Until then, 
something of a scrutiny reserve existed for the ‘Third Pillar’ if the EU, as decisions on Justice and 
Home Affairs (later Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal affairs) required the consent of 
the Dutch Parliament. When the pillar structure was abolished with the Lisbon Treaty, the Dutch 
Parliament decided to retain the ‘consent procedure’ only for a narrow range of issues legislated 
at the EU level under the consultation procedure – and thus outside of the ordinary co-decision 
procedure. Instead, the current scrutiny reserve system was established: Whenever the Tweede 
Kamer
32
 finds a ‘European legislative proposal to be of such importance that it wants to be 
accurately informed and updated of all steps taken by the government in the negotiation 
process’
33
, the government is obliged to send an explanatory memorandum (fiche) on the 
proposal within three weeks of its publication. If parliament then decides, within two months 
after the publication of a proposal, to place the document under a scrutiny reserve, the 
government is also obliged to enter a parliamentary reserve in the council negotiations. Once the 
scrutiny reserve has been formally approved by the plenary, the Tweede Kamer has four weeks to 
scrutinise the proposal and to consult with the government, generally in the form of a debate with 
the responsible minister in the relevant standing committee, upon which the reserve is lifted. 
Although any legislative proposal can be subject to a scrutiny reserve, the aim of the system is to 
filter out important proposals as early as possible. Each year, based on proposals from the 
Standing Committees and coordinated by the EAC, the Tweede Kamer draws up a list of 
prioritised legislative proposals from the European Commission’s legislative and working 
program, indicating which proposals may be subject to a scrutiny reserve or a subsidiarity check. 
Thus, in late 2011, the Dutch Parliament examined the European Commission’s Work Program for 
                                                          
29 Cited from L. F.M. Besselink and B. van Mourik, The Parliamentary Legitimacy of the European Union: The Role of the 
States General within the European Union, Utrecht Law Review 8 (1), 2012, 28-50, p. 31.  
30 Besselink and van Mourik, op. cit. fn 29. 
31 On the following Besselink and van Mourik op. cit. fn 29, Davor Jancic, Caveats from Karlsruhe and Berlin: whither 
democracy after Lisbon, Columbia Journal of European Law 6 (3), 2010, 337-384. 
32 The procedure in the Eerste Kamer is rather similar, see references in fn 29. 
33 Dutch House of Representatives: List of prioritized proposals from the European Commission’s 2012 Work Programme, 
online at: http://www.tweedekamer.nl/images/EU_Scrutiny_2012_118-228129.pdf.  
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2012, pre-selecting 7 documents for the subsidiarity check and 12 documents for the parliamentary 
reserve.
34
 The procedure can thus also be understood as an early warning system that helps the 
Tweede Kamer to signal to the government which documents MPs expect to be of high salience.  
1.2 Mandating systems: the (usually) inbuilt reserve 
The overview would remain incomplete without a look at what could be called the strictest, albeit 
usually implicit, scrutiny reserve, namely the mandating systems. The Danish scrutiny system is 
famous for the ability of the European Affairs Committee of the Folketing to mandate the 
negotiating minister, or rather to accept or amend the negotiation strategy presented by the 
minister before the EU committee. The mandating takes place in a meeting of the EAC at least 
one week prior to the Council meeting and usually applies to European issues of ‘major 
importance’
35
, although the latter is interpreted broadly. On average, the government requests a 
mandate on about one third of all legislative proposals.
36
 
At the domestic level, the mandating system implies that the government minister cannot agree 
to a legislative proposal until s/he has received a parliamentary mandate. The system thus has not 
an explicit, but an in-built, scrutiny reserve. At the European level, this means accordingly that a 
minister will enter a parliamentary reserve in two cases: first, at the level of COREPER if the 
government plans to obtain a negotiation mandate for the final decision in the Council and 
second, at the level of the Council if the government needs to adapt its original negotiation 
position and thus needs to ask for an altered mandate from the EAC.  
Similar systems can be found in Austria, Estonia, Finland, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia 
and Sweden. As in the Danish Folketing, the reserve is usually implicit, while parliamentary 
Standing Rules or other relevant documents do not contain any formal rules on a parliamentary 
reserve. As a result, it is difficult to obtain information on the obligation of their governments to 
enter parliamentary reserves in the Council bodies and on how this is handled in practice. 
Although our interviews indicate that the Polish government, for example, has recently entered 
parliamentary reserves fairly frequently at the COREPER level, ‘the Sejm does not control whether 
the government does so [enter a reserve] before the Sejm’s Committee has adopted an opinion’.
37
  
Only in Lithuania have we found more explicit rules. Here, parliament can put a proposal under a 
scrutiny reserve until the national position ‘is co-ordinated with the Seimas of the Republic of 
                                                          
34 Dutch House of Representatives: List of prioritized proposals, op.cit. fn 33. 
35 Folketing, The European Affairs Committee of the Folketing – Parliamentary control of government policy in the EU, 
Copenhagen, Folketing, 2010. 
36 D. Finke and M. Melzer, Parliamentary Scrutiny of EU Law Proposals in Denmark: Why do Governments request a 
Negotiation Mandate? Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, Political Science Series, 127, 2012. 
37 Knutelská, Working Practices Winning Out over Formal Rules, op. cit. fn 11, p. 332. 
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Lithuania’ (Art. 180-18 1. Statute of the Seimas) and thus for example in cases of conflict with the 
government over the national negotiation position, but also if parliament feels that EU issues ‘call 
for deeper and broader debates with the public and social and economic partners’.
38
  
In Hungary, in contrast, Article 4 (6) of the ‘Act on the cooperation of the Parliament and the 
Government in European Union affairs’ even rules out the possibility of a parliamentary reserve, 
at least beyond the eight-week period guaranteed by the Lisbon Treaty: ‘If the Parliament fails to 
adopt a standpoint concerning the position of the Government by the deadline required by the 
European Union's agenda for decision-making, the Government will decide in its absence on the 
position to be represented in the decision-making process of the European Union.’ 
As this first section shows, the UK scrutiny reserve provision has been something of a model or 
inspiration for provisions in other member states, but, only the Czech Chamber of Deputies and 
the Maltese House of Representatives have copied the formal obligation of the government not to 
agree to a legislative proposal in the Council until parliament has cleared the proposal, i.e. until a 
point in time decided by parliament. In most of the member states that follow this system, 
parliaments are rather granted a limited period during which the reserve applies. In addition, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Italy all have implemented provisions somewhat similar 
to and often inspired by the UK model, but with specific national characteristics. Here, we find 
innovative changes, such as the pre-selection of documents to be placed under scrutiny on the 
basis of the Commission’s annual program in the Netherlands, which turns the provision into a 
kind of ‘early warning system’ for both, the parliament and the government.  
While the rationale for most scrutiny provisions has mainly been to provide adequate time and 
information for parliamentary scrutiny, some provisions, such as the German one, but especially 
the mandating systems, mainly aim at securing parliamentary influence on the government’s 
negotiation position. Those systems, where parliaments can bind the government to a specific 
negotiation mandate, usually contain only implicit provisions for the scrutiny reserve. Here, it 
clearly makes a difference whether the government is obliged to obtain a mandate – at least on 
important proposals – as in Denmark, or whether the government is bound to a parliamentary 
resolution only if parliament actually issues one. In the latter case, the lack of a formal reserve 
provision leaves open the question to what extent the government can engage in negotiations at 
the EU level before parliament has expressed an opinion. Finally, although mandating systems 
strengthen the position of parliaments in EU affairs (at least in theory, if not always in practice) a 
potential drawback compared to the explicit scrutiny provisions above is that parliamentary 
scrutiny basically has to follow the EU legislative schedule. Mandates have to be given before the 
                                                          
38 Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania (without year), Parliamentary scrutiny of European Union matters in Lithuania, 
online at: http://www.eic.lrs.lt/index.php?1650178686. 
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final adoption of a proposal in the Council regardless of when this decision takes place. 
Parliaments with specific scrutiny reserves, in contrast, usually have an – albeit often short – 
guaranteed period for scrutiny. In addition, at least some parliaments have the possibility of 
upholding a scrutiny reserve until and beyond the final decision in the Council if they have not 
finished their scrutiny. In practice, this difference, however, may not be all that important given 
that overrides are possible in both systems, and that parliamentary majorities usually have no 
interest in tying the hands of their governments and weaken the member state’s influence in the 
Council negotiations. 
2. Reserves in the Council in practice 
Domestic procedures related to the scrutiny reserve tell us little, of course, about their actual 
impact on the negotiations at the EU level, which depends not only on the rules governing the 
use of reserves in EU negotiations, but also on the incentives for national government 
representatives to employ and adhere to them. In this section we will therefore first look at the 
provisions for parliamentary scrutiny at the EU level including the eight-week scrutiny period 
accorded to national parliaments under the Early Warning System of the Lisbon Treaty. We will 
then discuss the formal provisions and procedures for parliamentary and other reserves in 
COREPER or Council negotiations, followed by a discussion of the actual impact parliamentary 
reserves have on governmental negotiations. Finally, we will assess parliamentary reserves as a 
means to strengthen domestic executive-legislative cooperation in EU affairs.  
2.1. The eight-week period: an ‘EU reserve’ 
The idea that national parliaments should be given sufficient time to scrutinise EU draft 
legislation has been progressively acknowledged at the EU level. In 1999, the Amsterdam Treaty 
protocol on national parliaments introduced the first minimum scrutiny period by stipulating 
that a period of six weeks should be respected between the proposal of the Commission and the 
meeting of the Council
39
. Ten years later, Article 4 of the ‘Protocol on the Role of National 
Parliaments’ of the Lisbon Treaty reaffirmed and expanded this rule: 
‘An eight-week period shall elapse between a draft legislative act being made 
available to national Parliaments in the official languages of the Union and the 
date when it is placed on a provisional agenda for the Council for its adoption or 
for adoption of a position under a legislative procedure. […] Save in urgent cases 
for which due reasons have been given, a ten-day period shall elapse between 
                                                          
39 More precisely: a minimum period of six weeks must elapse between the Commission's adoption of a legislative proposal 
and the date when that proposal can be placed on the Council's agenda for the adoption of a common position or for its 
adoption as a legislative act. 
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the placing of a draft legislative act on the provisional agenda for the Council 
and the adoption of a position’. 
This provision can be seen as an institutional transfer of domestic provisions to the EU level. 
Indeed, the first ‘reserve’ of six weeks included in the Amsterdam Treaty Protocol originated from 
a proposal of the UK House of Commons in 1995.
40
 Beyond the fact of granting a minimum 
scrutiny period, the provision implicitly supports the view that the relevant moment for national 
parliaments to look at EU documents is early in the EU decision-making process. It legitimates 
the idea, repeatedly expressed by political and academic actors, that to express views late in the 
process is inefficient in terms of impact. 
However, this provision is rather symbolic since it does not have much effect on the regular 
Council procedures. First, apart from the provisions for a minimum period during the decision-
making process, the treaties and protocols say nothing about the practice of parliamentary 
reserves by individual Member States at the level of the Council of ministers. Clearly, the issue is 
regarded as a domestic one - that is, a matter of national sovereignty - and thus as relevant to the 
political and coordination processes within the member states. 
Second, this provision is rather symbolic since it does not have much impact on the regular 
Council procedures. The European legislative process takes time and always lasts months. For 
instance in the case of co-decision, even legislative proposals adopted after the first reading 
(which tend to become the norm
41
) take around 14 months to conclude
42
. Providing national 
parliaments with eight weeks for scrutiny therefore do not come at a great cost for national 
governments and EU institutions. However, what is more relevant for national parliaments, is 
how soon after the submission of a Commission proposal deliberations start in the Council’s 
preparatory bodies, the Working Groups and COREPER, and how soon informal (i.e. not yet final) 
agreements are found on a proposal or decision. In the case of early agreements, the crucial 
negotiations take place in private long before the Council of Ministers reaches its common 
position. Although we lack clear data, it can be assumed that the time period during which 
parliaments can have a potential impact is thus far shorter.  
                                                          
40 A. Cygan, The Role of National Parliaments in the New Constitutional Order, in T. Tridimas and P. Nebbia (eds), EU 
Law for the 21st Century: Rethinking the New Legal Order, 154 -169, p. 158 
41 O. Costa, R. Dehousse, A. Trakalova, La codécision et les accords précoces: progrès ou détournement de la procédure 
législative ? Notre Europe 84, 2011. 
42 Data covering 1999-2008. See the Memorandum by the Council of the EU, 20 April 2009, submitted to the House of 
Lords European Union Committee for its 17th Report of Session 2008–09 on Co-decision and National Parliamentary 
Scrutiny, 21 July 2009, p. 87 (annexe). Toshkov and Rasmussen also calculated that the average duration for non-trivial 
first reading agreements was 11.2 months. See D. D. Toshkov, A. Rasmussen: Time to Decide: The Effect of Early 
Agreements on Legislative Duration in the European Union. European Integration online Papers (EIoP), 16 (11), 2012, pp. 
14-15. Online at: http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2012-011a.htm. 
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2.2. The procedure in COREPER and Council meetings 
As mentioned in the introduction, governments can enter a number of different reserves on EU 
documents: 
 ‘In the Council informal practice, Council members usually characterise their 
"reserves" by an adjective, the purpose of which is to give some indication to 
other Council members of the nature of their reserve. There are "waiting 
reserves", "scrutiny reserves", "substance reserves", "linguistic reserves" and 
"parliamentary reserves". The latter indicates that the delegation in question 
has triggered its national internal procedure of associating its national 
parliament to the process’.
43
 
However, the whole system of reserves and their actual use in the Council or COREPER, and this 
includes parliamentary reserves, is somewhat shrouded in mystery due to both the lack of public 
information and the prevalence of informal practices. In 2002, the General Secretariat of the 
Council indicated: ‘The Council Secretariat does not keep statistics about reserves, which are of a 
transitory nature’
44
. Yet in 2009, the Secretariat did make the following available to the British 
House of Lords: 
Table 1 Number of parliamentary reserves on files conducted under the co-decision procedure during 
the 45 COREPER I meetings of 2008 
France UK Denmark Malta Slovakia total 
27 11 6 1 1 46 
Source: General Secretariat of the Council of the EU
45
 
 
The figures show that, on average, a parliamentary reserve was entered once per meeting of the 
COREPER I, which indicates that it cannot be regarded as a marginal procedure, at least in terms 
of the frequency of use by some member state governments. For the more recent period, an 
experienced official of the Council estimated that in the COREPER I Polish and French 
representatives use this procedure often, British, Danish and Dutch representatives once in a 
while and German officials only very rarely.
 46
  
                                                          
43 Information from the General Secretariat of the Council, Working group IV, working document 33, European 
Convention, 8 October 2002, p.5. 
44 Information from the General Secretariat of the Council, op. cit. fn 43, p. 5. Our repeated requests for updated data on 
the use of parliamentary reserves, however, also received the reply that such data was not collected by the Secretariat. 
45 Memorandum by the Council of the EU, op. cit. fn 42, p. 88. 
46 Senior Official, Council General Secretariat. Interview C by phone, 24 and 26 January 2012. For the EU-15, Cygan 
mentions the UK, Denmark, Sweden and The Netherlands as the most frequent users of the scrutiny reserve, and Greece, 
Portugal and Pain as the most infrequent, see A. Cygan, The Role of National Parliaments, o. cit. fn 40, p. 160. 
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What does putting down a parliamentary reserve by a national civil servant or a minister actually 
mean? Reserves are communicated by the delegations in writing in the preparation of COREPER, 
in the so-called Mertens and Antici groups. These notifications of reservations are then used by 
the General Secretariat to compile a list that is read out at the beginning of the COREPER 
meeting. At the COREPER meetings, reserves or even parliamentary positions as such are rarely 
mentioned during the discussion themselves - especially since the 2004 enlargement, the 
negotiations between 27 member states are too formalised to leave much space for explanations.
47
 
The main rationale of entering a reserve is to inform the other negotiation partners about 
ongoing domestic consultation on a proposal. As such, it has no immediate consequences 
regarding the negotiation process. This is underlined by the fact that up to and including the 
COREPER level reserves do not prevent the representative of the Member State from bargaining 
and even from accepting a political agreement, which is de facto binding for the member state, 
even if the proposal is formally adopted in the Council only after the parliamentary reserve is 
lifted (see below).
48
 Even in the UK, where the reserve procedure is strictly applied, an official 
memo explains: ‘At levels below the Council, it is acceptable for the Government, if content with 
the document, to indicate general agreement subject to the Parliamentary reserve’.
49
  
The consequences of parliamentary reserves in the following stage of the Council proceedings are 
less clear. According to the General Secretariat of the Council, a ‘parliamentary reserve, like all 
other types of reserves, if not lifted by the member concerned, counts, according to the Council's 
Rules of Procedure, as a “no” vote’.
50
 However, the 2009 Rules of Procedure of the Council do not, 
in fact, mention reserves of any kind.
51
 This was also confirmed by a former member of the 
Council Secretariat.
52
 The only provision on reservations can be found in the Comments on the 
Rules of Procedure of 2000, an internal document from the General Secretariat, which stipulates 
that:  
‘A member of the Council may wish to receive confirmation from his/her 
national authorities of the position to be adopted or the internal formalities for 
defining the position may not be completed. He/she will then enter a reservation 
which may subsequently be withdrawn; the reservation must be withdrawn 
                                                          
47 S. Hagemann and J. De Clerck-Sachsse, Old Rules, New Game. Decision-Making in the Council of Ministers after the 
2004 Enlargement, CEPS Special Report, Brussels, p. 12. 
48 R. Zbíral, Expressing Disagreement in the Council of the European Union, Contemporary European Studies 1/2008, 40-
62, p. 52. 
49 Cabinet Office, Parliamentary Scrutiny of European Union Documents, op. cit. fn 5, p. 59. 
50 Memorandum by the Council of the EU, op. cit. fn 42, p. 87, italics added. 
51 Council Rules of Procedure 2009, online at: eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= 
OJ:L:2009:325:0035:0061:en:PDF. Working Group IV of the Convention on the Future of Europe dealing with the role of 
national parliaments had indeed recommended in its final report that parliamentary reserves be given a clearer status in 
the Council’s rules of Procedure, a recommendation that has obviously not been implemented. Report online at: 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/02/cv00/cv00353.en02.pdf. 
52 Former Director, Legal Service, Council General Secretariat. Interview D by phone, 8 February 2012. 
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during the same [Council] meeting. If at the end of the meeting the reservation 
is not withdrawn and the required majority has therefore not been achieved, the 
item is not adopted. It is deleted from the provisional agenda and added to the 
provisional agenda of another meeting.’
53
  
Thus, a reserve does not prevent the Presidency to place an item on the Council agenda – even as 
an A point.
54
 It does, however, seem to prevent the government representative from agreeing to a 
proposal on the day of the Council meeting, even if this is not a strictly formal rule. If this 
threatens to be the case, national representatives, Council Secretariat and the Presidency work 
closely together, either to clear a reserve before the scheduled Council meeting, or alternatively to 
reschedule the dossier at a later meeting.
55
 According to the General Secretariat of the Council: 
‘When such a [parliamentary] reserve is raised, the practice is to try to accommodate the 
delegation concerned by delaying the final adoption of the act in question’.
56
 As a result, the 
reserve may delay the decision on a dossier for two to three weeks. While this suggests that 
reserves are taken seriously and not easily breached, such a rather short delay does not have 
much of an impact on the full legislative process, and even less so on the content of the final act, 
according to Council actors. 
Yet it also happens that the final adoption cannot be delayed. This can be the case at the end of 
the year when decisions need to be taken for the coming one, for instance regarding fishery 
quotas. In addition, government representatives may find themselves with an open parliamentary 
reserve on the day of the Council decision if Parliament refuses to clear a proposal, but also if 
‘somebody simply overslept’
57
, or in phases in which the coordination with the competent 
parliamentary committee at home is especially difficult to organise, e.g. in times when parliament 
is in recess.
58
 Government representatives then need to decide whether to uphold the 
parliamentary reserve or to override it. If they decide to uphold the reserve, they cannot agree to a 
proposal, but have to at least abstain. Under unanimity vote, abstention is not counted as a no 
vote. Under qualified majority vote, abstention is counted as a no vote, but this is unlikely to have 
an impact unless majorities are very narrow. The mere fact that a legislative proposal can be 
adopted under QMV even if one or more member states have placed a parliamentary reserve, 
whereas it cannot be adopted if a linguistic reserve has been entered
59
, indicates that the 
                                                          
53 COUNCIL GUIDE, Internal document, II. Comments on the Council’s Rules of Procedure, - September 2000 - General 
Secretariat, DG F — Information Policy, Transparency and Public Relations, p. 22, online available at: 
http://aei.pitt.edu/8824/1/8824.pdf. 
54 Interview B. Interestingly, the practice is very different from interpretation in the British Guide on scrutiny reserves: 
‘The effect of placing a scrutiny reserve (in the Council sense) should be to prevent the Presidency putting the item to the 
Council as an ‘A’ point’. Cabinet Office, Parliamentary Scrutiny of European Union Documents, op. cit. fn 5, p. 57. 
55 Member of the Permanent Representation of France. Interview E by phone, 6 February 2012. 
56 Information from the General Secretariat of the Council, op. cit. fn 44, p. 5. 
57 Interview C. 
58 Interview A. 
59 A ‘linguistic reserve’ means that the document is not available in all official languages. ‘Except as otherwise decided 
unanimously by the Council on grounds of urgency, the Council shall deliberate and take decisions only on the basis of 
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parliamentary scrutiny of governments is considered as a purely domestic procedure with only 
little direct impact on the Council proceedings. 
Given the lack of empirical information on the actual use of reserves, it is difficult to assess how 
often the Council adopts a measure even though a parliamentary reservation is upheld, i.e. where 
the government decides not to override the domestic scrutiny reserve and to lift the reserve in the 
Council. A member of the Council Secretariat from 1992 to 2009 only remembers two - 
unspecified – occasions when the Council took decisions even though a member state upheld a 
parliamentary reserve.
60
 A member of the British Permanent Representation mentions two cases 
for the period since 2010: the Comitology decision in February 2010 and an EU-Mozambique 
fisheries agreement in January 2011, where the UK representative had to (or rather decided to) 
abstain due to an upheld reserve.
61
 In these examples, the government was in favour but knew 
that the text would be approved without its support anyway. This, of course, is not new. Using 
abstentions in the Council when it does not have any negative consequences is a classic strategy.
62
  
2.3. A marginal procedure in the Council negotiations 
MPs and clerks often stress that they can support their government in the Council by scrutinising 
EU documents
63
, and there is indeed some anecdotal evidence that government representatives 
use parliamentary resolutions or mandates to strengthen their bargaining position: in our 
interviews, officials explained that they may use parliamentary positions in the Working Groups if 
they are useful for them to back up their point of view.
64
 A member of the Italian Permanent 
Representation even says that he regularly goes through the reasoned opinions on subsidiarity 
sent to the Commission to have them as background information for the negotiations in the 
working group.
65
 
The above seems to support Schelling’s ‘paradox of weakness’, further developed by Putnam’s two 
level game theory, which postulates that international-level negotiators can use their domestic 
constraints strategically to exert concessions from their negotiation partners.
66
 And indeed, a 
number of studies have shown that domestic ratification constraints (e.g. referendums or 
                                                                                                                                                                          
documents and drafts drawn up in the languages specified in the rules in force governing languages’ (Art. 14.1 of the 
Council’s Rules of Procedure).  
60 Interview D. 
61 Interview C. 
62 Golub, Jonathan, In the Shadow of the Vote? Decisionmaking in the European Community, International Organization, 
53, 1999, pp. 733–64. 
63 See for example interview material in R. Holzhacker, National Parliamentary Scrutiny over EU Issues Comparing the 
Goals and Methods of Governing and Opposition Parties, European Union Politics 3 (4), 2002, 459–479. 
64 Interview A, B, E, and Member of the Permanent Representation of Italy. Interview F by phone, 6 February 2012. 
65 Interview F. 
66 Th. C. Schelling, 1960, The strategy of conflict. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press; R. D. Putnam, 
Diplomacy and Domestic Politics - The Logic of Two-Level Games, International Organization 42 (3), 1988, 427-460.  
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parliamentary ratification) can have an impact on the negotiations during EU summit meetings or 
Treaty negotiations.
67
 The same, however, is not the case for legislative negotiations in the 
Council of the EU, where research has shown that parliamentary constraints play a minor role 
during bargaining.
68
 In a recent study by Johansson, for example, only a minority of permanent 
representatives interviewed were willing to signal parliamentary constraints in the negotiations 
and considered them useful to demonstrate the importance of a particular issue while at the same 
time being ‘careful not to become annoying’.
69
  
According to Johansson  
‘Most respondents acknowledged that the counterparts’ positions were 
considered but did not attach any particular importance to the domestic 
constraints of other parties… Partly for the same reasons that some 
respondents would not signal domestic constraints, they would recognise that 
signalling from others would not matter as they all have domestic situations 
and interests to deal with. [Only] two respondents said that when someone is 
referring to the national parliament it gives certain weight to the argument but 
maintained that it is other factors that determine what action that is taken.’
70
 
As our interviews indicate, this is certainly the case for parliamentary scrutiny reserves. First, a 
scrutiny reserve as such is not a parliamentary statement on the content of a legislative proposal 
and thus cannot be used to back up a governmental position. Rather, the reserves simply indicate 
that parliament has not yet completed the scrutiny process. As indicated in a report by the House 
of Lords 
‘It is important to stress here that the Reserve is not a device requiring 
Ministers to agree with the Committee. Hence a proposal which we have 
considered, to which we have strong objections, but on which we have 
completed scrutiny, would not be subject to a reserve. Any proposal which we 
are still considering, however, even if we have no objection to it, remains subject 
to a reserve.’
71
  
                                                          
67 S. Hug and Th. König, In view of ratification: Governmental preferences and domestic constraints at the Amsterdam 
Intergovernmental Conference, International Organization 56 (2), 2002, 447-476; ‘J. B. Slapin, Who Is Powerful?: 
Examining Preferences and Testing Sources of Bargaining Strength at European Intergovernmental Conferences, European 
Union Politics 7 (1), 2006, 51-76. 
68 S. Bailer and G. Schneider, 2006, Nash versus Schelling? The Importance of constraints in legislative bargaining, in R. 
Thomson (ed.), The European Union decides, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 153-177; G. Schneider, D. Finke and 
S. Bailer, Bargaining Power in the European Union. An Evaluation of Competing Game-theoretic models, Political Studies 
58 (1), 2010, 85-103. 
69 Markus Johansson, Behavioural effects of Domestic Constraints in EU Council Negotiations’, Paper presented at the 
ECPR general conference, Reykjavik 25-27 August 2011, page 18. 
70 Markus Johansson, Behavioural effects of Domestic Constraints, op. cit. fn 69, p. 19. 
71 House of Lords, 1st Report of the Select Committee on the European Union - Review of Scrutiny of European Legislation 
with Evidence, 3 December 2002, p. 18, online at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200203/ldselect/ldeucom/15/15.pdf. 
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However, theoretically government representatives could, of course, use parliamentary reserves to 
influence the content of the negotiations by indicating that their own parliament will only lift a 
reserve once specific parliamentary demands have been met. As mentioned above, a 
parliamentary reserve that is not lifted could hamper the decision making process in the Council 
– at least with regard to decisions under unanimity or where qualified majorities are very narrow. 
However, there are rather few parliaments that can uphold a scrutiny reserve indefinitely and 
thus until disagreements over the domestic negotiation position are settled. As outlined above, 
most reserves systems have a built-in deadline. In addition, domestic rules on parliamentary 
reserves reserve a right for the government to override a parliamentary reserve in cases of urgency 
and/or to safeguard important national interests. And as our interview partners indicated, 
explaining during negotiations in COREPER or the Council that the government finds itself in 
difficulties with its parliament on a given issue may actually lower the bargaining position of the 
representatives. Where domestic parliaments can put strong constraints on the government, such 
as in Denmark, it could indicate that the representatives are as yet unable to make credible 
commitments. In most cases, however, mentioning problems in Parliament will simply not be 
considered a credible claim.
72
 This is powerfully illustrated by the fact that the Finnish 
government even decided not to use the term ‘parliamentary reserve’ at all. Despite a mandating 
system similar to the Danish one, ‘the Government has indicated that it does not use so called 
“parliamentary scrutiny reserves” in the Council, since the latter is often interpreted as if the 
Government agreed with the proposal and it had no substantial objection against political 
agreement’.
73
 The Finnish Parliament has accepted this practice, realising that the important issue 
is ‘that the influence of the Parliament is secured by keeping the question de facto open until the 
national position is fully formulated’.
74
  
This should not imply that parliamentary reserves are never a useful too in the negotiations. As 
Bindi points out regarding the introduction of the scrutiny reserve system in Italy: ‘Legend has it 
that Rocco Buttiglione [minister for EU policies in the Berlusconi II government] noticed at a 
certain point that the wise use of certain forms of parliamentary scrutiny reserve could be very 
useful for the negotiating delegations; he thus began acting as if Italy had one too, and then began 
working on a law that would actually allow Italy to use the parliamentary scrutiny tool’.
75
  
In general, however, our impression is that government representatives may mention a 
parliamentary resolution to support their views but tend to avoid presenting a parliamentary 
reserve as a matter of domestic problems. Thus, if mentioned at all, the typical claim seems to be 
                                                          
72 Interview D. 
73 Paper by Kimmo Kiljunen, Working group IV, working document 16, European Convention, 22 July 2002, p. 4. 
74 Paper by Kimmo Kiljunen, op. cit fn 73.  
75 Bindi, Italy and the European Union, op. cit. fn 25, p. 100. 
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‘my parliament is behind me’ rather than ‘I still need to sort out trouble with my parliament’. 
According to our interviews, representatives therefore usually simply inform their colleagues of 
the fact that their reserve has a parliamentary origin.  
Within the domestic arena this does not, however, prevent governments from presenting reserves 
as a serious obstacle to their negotiation aims, especially when having to explain scrutiny 
overrides to their parliamentary committees. As Michael Meacher (former British environment 
minister) argued out in a public evidence session of the House of Commons European Scrutiny 
Committee:  
‘All that I would say is that, if I had maintained the reserve, which, in principle, 
there is absolutely no question I would prefer to have done, and that is and will 
remain the situation, but if I had done so in these unusual circumstances, in the 
face of other Member States voting under Qualified Majority Voting, I do 
believe it would have severely damaged our reputation as a strong supporter of 
the emissions trading.’
76
 
While parliamentary reserves can thus hardly be used to influence the content 
of a decision in the Council, they can be useful to delay a decision.
77
 The 
emphasis in the Lisbon Treaty on the strengthened role of national parliaments 
provides governments with a strong normative argument that can be used to 
delay or slow down the decision-making process. According to a member of the 
British Permanent Representation, ‘In a Transport Council last year [2011], on a 
dossier on trans European networks that the Polish presidency wanted to push, 
we evoked the spirit of the protocols on parliamentary involvement and 
subsidiarity to argue that this was going too quickly. The proposal had only 
been tabled one month before the Council. We used this argument three times 
during the last twelve months and we are not the only government doing this’.
78
 
The impression is that while reserves are not seen as a serious obstacle to the bargaining process 
as such, the fact that some representatives have to negotiate under parliamentary scrutiny 
reserves is generally respected. As a UK Permanent Representative put it, ‘People recognise it is 
ultimately a job for the Presidency and the Secretariat to record and observe scrutiny reserves. I 
have not detected a sense in which there is a lack of sympathy or understanding for what is 
involved.’
79
 Still, he also pointed out that representatives may come under quite some pressure to 
lift the reserves when the Presidency or a group of member states push for a quick decision: 
                                                          
76 House of Commons, Uncorrected Evidence presented by Rt Hon Michael Meacher MP on 6 November 2002 - Scrutiny 
Reserve Breaches, HC 1308-I. 
77 Examples are difficult to find, but see Jörg Monar, Justice and Home Affairs, Journal of Common Market Studies 46, 
Annual Review 2007, 109–126. 
78 Interview A. 
79 House of Commons, Democracy and Accountability in the EU and the Role of National Parliaments, 33. Report of the 
European Scrutiny Committee, HC 152-xxxiii, minutes of evidence Here: examination of Sir Nigel Sheinwald, 26 February 
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‘Particular cases do arise; one which obviously created difficulties with your 
Committee was over the Arrest Warrant (…) where the Heads of Government 
gave Ministers in the Justice and the Home Affairs Council, and those of us who 
work for them, a very clear mandate (…) to get a set of legislative measures 
agreed, if possible, by a certain deadline.’
80
  
As Cygan argues, the system of rotating presidencies often leads to presidencies producing an 
‘artificial peak of activity towards the end of each six-month period as Presidencies apply political 
pressure to ensure agreement in priority policy areas’.
81
 What has been pointed out as 
problematic in this regard, is that not all member states have the same rules on parliamentary 
involvement and on scrutiny reserves in particular:  
‘If there were a kind of equal perception of the importance of parliamentary 
scrutiny across the European Union, that would help. If you are in a situation 
where the UK, Denmark, one or two others, are the ones who most often have 
scrutiny reserves, it is frankly easier for a presidency, whose interest is clearly 
getting the business done, to put the pressure on you, than if 14 Member States 
were saying, sorry, they cannot agree because they have not completed the 
parliamentary scrutiny.’
82
 
In the end, interviews with both Permanent Representation members and Secretariat General 
officials show that the reserve procedure is not a significant tool at the stage of the COREPER and 
Council meetings. As a member of the French Permanent Representation admitted quite openly: 
‘The reserves are a legal obligation that we have. In some meetings, I have to put a reserve at one 
out of two points. There is no further use of them. We simply fulfil an obligation’
83
. 
2.4. A means for enhancing cooperation between Government and 
Parliament at domestic level 
The above paints a rather bleak picture when it comes to the actual impact of parliamentary 
reserves on EU decision-making. This does not come as a surprise given the culture of 
compromise within EU institutions including the most intergovernmental ones.
84
 Given that 
actual voting in the Council is rather rare
85
, a procedure aimed at preventing them from agreeing 
to a decision through a formal vote without authorization has a limited impact. In addition, the 
reserve procedure does not change the fact that MPs and clerks do not participate in and do not 
                                                          
80 House of Commons, Democracy and Accountability in the EU, op. cit. fn 79. 
81 A. Cygan, The Role of National Parliaments, op. cit. fn 40, p. 161. 
82 House of Commons, Democracy and Accountability in the EU and the Role of National Parliaments, 33. Report of the 
European Scrutiny Committee, HC 152-xxxiii, minutes of evidence. Here: examination of Stephen Wall, 20 March 2002, 
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84 Stéphanie Novak, La prise de decision au Conseil, Paris, Dalloz, 2011. 
85 M. Mattila, Contested decisions: Empirical analysis of voting in the European Union Council of Ministers, European 
Journal of Political Research 43 (1), 2004, 29–50, pp. 30-31. 
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belong to the closed world of COREPER and Councils of ministers. They are neither in contact 
with other governments nor with the Council Secretariat, and their contacts with their Permanent 
Representations are limited. Within the Council bodies, delegates act on formal instruction from 
their governments, and it is only through the filter of the coordination processes within the 
government that parliamentary opinions may be taken into account in national positions - or 
not.
86
  
However, even if the parliamentary reserve procedure appears to be of generally marginal 
importance in the Council, it should be noted that it helps increase formal and informal 
cooperation and communication between EACs and national governments. The common aim of 
Council officials, government delegates and, in most cases, of parliamentary clerks and MPs 
consists in clearing the reserves quickly, and definitely before the final Council meeting. This has 
had a two-fold impact: First, the reserve systems can have a disciplining effect on government 
administrations leading to better and earlier information of parliaments by the responsible 
government officials following a dossier. The reserve increases the incentives for desk officers in 
the ministries or in the executive coordination units to get sufficient information early to the 
competent parliamentary committee and to ensure that parliament can work quickly enough so 
as to prevent the national delegation from running into trouble with a pending parliamentary 
reserve in the Council at the end of the process. Indeed, the clearing of the procedure in due time 
makes a lot of communication necessary, notably at the administrative level, through letters, 
phone calls and e-mails. The British system also calls for the exchange of frequent letters between 
the concerned minister and the chairs of the EACs. This is, for instance, systematically the case 
when the government plans to override a reserve. This disciplining effect is also demonstrated by 
the fact that some administrations have set up special units for the cooperation with their 
parliaments. In France, a unit within the French General Secretariat for European Affairs (SGAE) 
is responsible – inter alia - for the coordination with the Assemblée and the Senate. Before their 
participation in EU negotiations, Ministers now have to enquire with the SGAE whether 
parliament intends to issue a resolution.
87
 In addition, the SGAE keeps an electronic file on all 
reserves, which is updated through regular contacts with both Houses. In the UK, the unit 
responsible for coordinating the Government’s work on Parliamentary scrutiny of EU business is 
the European and Global Issues Secretariat within the Cabinet Office. In addition, the 
Government established a new executive unit within the Europe Directorate in the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office whose task is to take care of the smooth information of and the 
coordination with the two Houses. According to an official, the political will to enhance relations 
between Parliament and the new administration resulted both in a steadier information flow 
                                                          
86 Interviews B and F. 
87 Premier Ministre, Circulaire du 21 juin 2010, op. cit. fn 14. 
   
26 
 
Lost in Transaction? Parliamentary Reserves in EU bargains 
towards both parliamentary Houses and in a closer coordination with their committees involved 
in the scrutiny of EU affairs. The official also indicated that overrides of reserves occur less 
frequently than they used to do, as the increase of information enables both Houses to clear the 
reserves at an earlier stage.
88
 
Second, reserves – especially those with a clear time limit – have helped to push the assemblies to 
speed up the scrutiny phase and to professionalise their scrutiny procedures. In general, reserves 
thus call for better coordination but also better cooperation, as parliamentary majorities are not 
interested in reducing the capacity of a government to vote in the Council. Therefore, in some 
Members States the implementation of the reserve procedure has strengthened the capacity to 
adopt resolutions and to lift reserves in time. The House of Lords, for example, has adopted a 
special procedure for times when parliament is in recess, and the House of Commons is currently 
working on a similar procedure.  
Procedures granting scrutiny time to national legislatures may thus foster cooperation on EU 
documents between national parliaments and their governments. Yet they do not automatically 
produce that effect since there are a number of means for national representatives to override 
reserves. The British example indicates that in order to be taken seriously by the government, the 
reserve system should be carefully protected by the EACs on a day-to-day basis. Here, the 
potential threat for the government is either to be in an uncomfortable situation in the Council if 
the document on the table has not been cleared yet at home, or to risk giving the impression of 
not showing the proper respect for parliamentary rights. And Ministers are indeed concerned 
about showing respect for Parliament, not least because MPs do tend to demonstrate cross-party 
solidarity in cases where they feel that the prestige or dignity of parliament is at stake. As a home 
office official pointed out, executive actors are aware of such ‘institutional patriotism’: ‘Our 
ministers can pull rank on our MPs [i.e. override a reserve], but only under exceptional 
circumstances – and every time we do that, it causes substantial controversy’.
89
  
As mentioned earlier, in most parliaments, in contrast, clerks and MPs do not even seem to know 
whether government representatives entered a reserve or not. The Polish example provides a 
good illustration: ‘While the government sometimes uses the parliamentary scrutiny reservations 
                                                          
88 Interview A. However, the data does not really confirm this yet: From July 2010 to June 2011, there were 50 overrides of 
scrutiny, compared to 86 overrides between July 2009 and June 2010, and 35 between July 2008 and June 2009. While the 
dissolution of Parliament during parts of April and May 2010 probably accounts for the greater number in the first 
semester of 2010, the numbers so far do not indicate a drastic decrease in overrides. See House of Lords, First Report, 
op.cit. fn 9, p. 31. 
89 UK Home Office official, cited from J. de Maillard and A. Smith, Projecting national preferences: police co-operation, 
organizations and polities, Journal of European Public Policy 19 (2), 2012, 257-274, p. 267. 
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in the Council deliberations when it is awaiting the Parliament’s position, the Sejm is not aware of 
the fact that such a reservation is held.’
90
.  
                                                          
90 Knutelská, Working Practices Winning Out over Formal Rules, op. cit. fn 11, p. 332. 
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Conclusion 
The study of the reserve procedure offers a mixed picture of the Europeanisation of national 
parliaments in terms of convergence. On the one hand, scrutiny reserve provisions are an obvious 
case of institutional transfer. Introduced in the United Kingdom in the mid-1970s and formalised 
as early as 1980, the instrument has been adopted by several other Member States that have what 
is called a document-based scrutiny system. Similarly, the Danish mandating system with its 
implicit scrutiny reserve has been the model for the procedures adopted by a number of member 
states, most prominently in Scandinavia and the new member states. Finally, the idea of a 
scrutiny reserve was also partly transferred to the EU level by granting national parliaments a 
minimum period for scrutiny before an agreement in the Council.  
On the other hand, the comparison both of the legal provisions and actual practices demonstrates 
that there are significant national differences in the way the reserves are designed and 
implemented. The main differences are related to the mechanism of the procedure (automatic 
reserve vs. those that have to be activated; formally unlimited vs. limited time for scrutiny, formal 
provisions vs. implicit reserves), the actual impact of the provisions on government delegations 
(with officials in the Council avoiding or accepting reserves to hamper their votes), the aim of the 
procedure (information or influence) and, at a more subtle level, on the degree of political 
commitment towards it. Those differences both confirm the non-mechanical aspect of the 
institutional transfers and the impact of national interpretations of the procedures aimed at 
involving national parliaments in EU affairs.  
The comparison between national provisions regarding the parliamentary reserves and the actual 
procedure within the various bodies of the Council stand in sharp contrast. In the domestic arena, 
scrutiny reserves are presented as a means for effective scrutiny or even influence. In Brussels, 
however, the reserves do not keep government representatives from bargaining and even from 
finding agreements. Regarding the impact of scrutiny reserve provisions, we also have to 
distinguish between the impact on the government representative’s behaviour within the Council 
bodies and the impact on the actual negotiations and their outcome. Representatives may be very 
diligent in entering parliamentary reserves, but the impact on the negotiations will remain 
negligible during very early stages of the legislative process or if the final agreement is likely to be 
carried by a large majority anyway. The key question in terms of parliamentary impact is, of 
course, whether government representatives uphold reserves - against their own interests - even if 
this may hamper the negotiation process, for example by delaying a decision or even by risking a 
majority agreement to fail due to the obligation to abstain from the vote. Although we lack 
specific data, our interviews indicate that this is hardly ever the case. Interestingly, our 
investigation also showed that parliamentary reserves are not even used for strategic means by 
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the governments, in the sense of strategically binding their hands to strengthen their negotiation 
position. Generally, governments can use reserves only to slow down the legislative process. 
It is thus tempting to conclude that parliamentary reserves have mostly, if not completely, to do 
with symbolic politics. Governments have generally accepted the introduction of reserve 
procedures as a (symbolic) compensation for the loss of parliamentary competencies, often in the 
context of Treaty revisions where national parliaments were in a veto position. As a result, MPs 
were able to claim publicly to have safeguarded parliamentary prerogatives even if the 
implementation of the reserve does not have any major consequences. Yet seeing parliamentary 
reserves only as symbolic politics would be missing a part of the picture. First of all, the slow but 
steady success of the UK scrutiny reserve model is a sign for the growing awareness that national 
parliaments should have the opportunity to scrutinise EU proposals and to provide their input 
before governments commit to EU legislation at the EU level. And given the fact that the EU 
Treaties have for a long time considered national parliaments activities as a purely domestic 
affair, the obligation of the EU institutions to provide national parliaments with a minimum time 
for scrutiny is rather remarkable and can be understood as a successful upload of national 
provisions to the EU level. Second, the introduction of a scrutiny reserve provision can serve as an 
incentive to enhance cooperation between parliaments and their governments. As mentioned 
above, agreements in the Council where reserves are still pending are very rare. This is, of course, 
both good and bad news. On the one hand, it indicates that parliamentary reserves will, when 
push comes to shove, have very little impact at the EU level and will simply be overridden. On the 
other hand, this also indicates not only that parliaments try to clear reserves in time and avoid 
obstructing the European legislative process, but also that reserve provisions may have a 
disciplining effect on governments as regards providing their parliaments with adequate and 
timely information. Finally, and unsurprisingly, our investigation suggests that the impact of 
scrutiny reserve provisions - both in terms of the representatives’ negotiation behaviour and the 
efficient cooperation with government - depends on the formal rules, but mainly on whether 
parliaments actually monitor the use of their reserves. For example, both the UK and the French 
representatives seem to enter parliamentary reserves fairly frequently, but as the literature as well 
as our interviews show, the provisions have far more meaning in the UK. In the UK, government 
representatives know that breaches of the reserve are investigated by the European Scrutiny 
Committee and may lead to a potentially rather uncomfortable questioning by the committee. In 
France, in contrast, officials openly admit that entering a reserve is a purely technical obligation 
without any major consequences. 
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